

國立中正大學哲學系 100 學年度碩士班甄試試題：英文閱讀理解能力  
請翻譯成中文，不用逐字翻譯

It is a failure to appreciate this deep complementarity that, I suspect, leads Paul Churchland (one of the best and most imaginative neurophilosophers around) to dismiss linguaform expression as just a shallow reflection of our "real" knowledge. Churchland fears that without such marginalization we might mistakenly depict all thought and cognition as involving the unconscious rehearsal of sentence-like symbol strings, and thus be blinded to the powerful pattern-and-prototype-based encodings that appear to be biologically and evolutionarily fundamental. But we have now scouted much fertile intermediate territory.<sup>18</sup> In combining an array of biologically basic pattern-recognition skills with the special "cognitive fixatives" of word and text, we (like the mangroves) create new landscapes—new fixed points in the sea of thought. Viewed as a complementary cognitive artifact, language can genuinely extend our cognitive horizons—and without the impossible burden of recapitulating the detailed contents of nonlinguistic thought.

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Psychoanalysis exists only because repression is unable to carry out its task. An idea, even though repressed, may nevertheless have causal efficacy. It may be able to generate some of the feelings and discharges that would appropriately accompany it. This is what Freud means by saying that emotions are least influenced by censorship.<sup>41</sup> He argues that one cannot deal with the expression of emotion in a dream in the same dismissive fashion as one is accustomed to treating the content: "If I am afraid of robbers in a dream, the robbers, it is true, are imaginary—but the fear is real."<sup>42</sup> The fear is real not just because it is felt. The emotions experienced in dreams seem to make a demand on us to make sense of them: "dreams insist with greater energy on their right to be included among our real mental experiences in respect to their emotional than in respect to their ideational content."<sup>43</sup>

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Derek Parfit might agree with this diagnosis of how things seem, from the inside. He has argued, famously, that our commonsense judgments about how and when we survive show that we are in the thrall of a nonreductionist picture of personal identity over time. This picture shapes our attitudes (the petty, undignified ones, for the most part!) toward ourselves and others. And it is incorrect. "We are not what we believe." Once we finally, fully renounce the picture, we will become less selfish, feel less separate from other people, and be rid of our unhealthy preoccupation with our own mortality.<sup>4</sup>

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