

103 學年度國立中正大學哲學系
碩士班甄試 英文閱讀理解能力試題

- 本測驗旨在測量英文閱讀與理解能力，請說明以下引文論旨，不必逐句翻譯

1.(40%)

“Can beliefs about value— that it is wrong to steal, for instance— actually be *true*? Or, for that matter, false? If so, what in the world can make such a belief true or false? Where do such values *come from*? God? But what if there is no god? Can values be just *out there*, part of what there really, finally, is? If so, how can we human beings be *in touch* with them? If some value judgments are true and others false, how can we human beings discover which are which? Even friends disagree about what is right and wrong; and of course we disagree even more strikingly with people of other cultures and ages. How can we think, without appalling arrogance, that we are right and others are just wrong? From what neutral perspective could the truth finally be tested and settled?”

2.(60%)

“Obviously we can’t solve these puzzles just by repeating our value judgments. It would be unhelpful to insist that wrongness must exist in the universe because torturing babies for the fun of it is wrong. Or that I am in touch with moral truth because I know that torturing babies is wrong. That would just beg the question: torturing babies is not wrong if there is no such thing as wrongness in the universe, and I can’t know that torturing babies is wrong unless I can be in touch with the truth about wrongness. No, these deep philosophical questions about the nature of the universe or the status of value judgments are not themselves questions about what is good or bad, right or wrong, wonderful or ugly. They belong not to ordinary ethical or moral or aesthetic rumination but to other, more technical departments of philosophy: to metaphysics or epistemology or the philosophy of language. That is why it is so important to distinguish two very different parts of moral philosophy: ordinary, first- order, substantive questions about what is good or bad, right or wrong, that call for value judgment, and philosophical, second- order, ‘metaethical,’ questions *about* those value judgments that call not for further value judgments but for philosophical theories of a quite different sort.”

(from Ronald Dworkin, 2011. *Justice for Hedgehogs*)