

說明以下引文之大意，不需逐字句翻譯。

1.

“The objectors to utilitarianism cannot always be charged with representing it in a discreditable light. On the contrary, those among them who entertain anything like a just ideal of its disinterested character, sometimes find fault with its standard as being too high for humanity. They say it is exacting too much to require that people shall always act from the inducement of promoting the general interests of society. But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals, and to confound the rules of action with the motive of it. It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them; but no system of ethics requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so done, if the rule of duty does not condemn them. It is the more unjust to utilitarianism that this particular misapprehension should be made a ground of objection to it, inasmuch as utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of action, though much with the worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble.” (40%)

2.

“One might hope that this inward retreat is only temporary. Take a particular case in which it looks to me as if things are a certain way. If things are indeed that way, that is — so far — a favor the world is doing me. The hope is that I might start from the fact that things look that way to me; add in anything else that the ground rules allow me to avail myself of, if it helps; and move from there, by my own unaided resources, without needing the world to do me any favors, to a satisfactory standing in the space of reasons with respect to the fact that the world is arranged the way it looks. And now that would no longer be a favor the world is doing me, a kindness I must simply hope for. Now I would have a derivatively satisfactory standing in the space of reasons, with respect to the fact that things are as they look, which I achieved by myself without needing to be indebted to the world.” (30%)

3.

“When I decide that an action is good I see it as being good in virtue of my recognition of other non-moral properties which the action has. These properties, perhaps, count as my reasons for calling this action good, and in making my decision I shall probably focus on a few special properties among all those from which, in the light of transitivity of resultance, the goodness of this action results. My reasons for calling it good, then, are standardly to be found among the qualities from which the goodness results. Can we say that my reasons for calling this action good must be generalisable, i.e. that I must also call good any action similar to it in those respects? In general we cannot say this; but it all depends on how similar the second action is to the original one. If my reasons for calling the first action good are that it had qualities ABC, I am not committed to calling any action similar to it in those respect, i.e. which also has qualities ABC, good. For the second action might have some further quality D which defeats any tendency that ABC had to make the action good.” (30%)