

◎請說明以下引文之大意，不需逐字句翻譯

1. Notice that indifference is not a smart choice, because then nothing about the mental states of others will give you pleasure. That will then cut down on your possible sources of enjoyment. Again, this seems to correspond to the empirical data: people tend to be virtuous or vicious; sheer indifference is rare and pathological. The indifferent cannot, by definition, be happy. The only advantage to indifference is that it enables you to avoid the pain that comes from the fact that the world contains pain without yourself being positively evil. If you are good, then you get pain from the pain there is, as well as pleasure from the pleasure; while if you are bad, you get pain from the pleasure, as well as pleasure from the pain. In either case you have to suffer some pain. Indifference will spare you this, but only by also excluding pleasure. Perhaps this will seem a good bargain if the sympathetic pain is too great and too frequent, but the cost is high in hedonistic terms. He who sincerely seeks pleasure cannot afford indifference. (30%)

2. Practical reasoning is concerned, at least in part, with the design of effective means for attaining our ends. If it is to have an appropriately settled framework and foundation, it must be grounded in ends that we regard as something more than means to still other ends. There must be certain things that we value and that we pursue for their own sakes. Now it is easy enough to understand how something comes to possess instrumental value. That is just a matter of its being causally efficacious in contributing to the fulfillment of a certain goal. But how is it that things may come to have for us a terminal value that is independent of their usefulness for pursuing further goals? In what acceptable way can our need for final ends be met?

It is love, I believe, that meets this need. It is in coming to love certain things—however this may be caused—that we become bound to final ends by more than an adventitious impulse or a deliberate willful choice. Love is the originating source of terminal value. If we loved nothing, then nothing would possess for us any definitive and inherent worth. (30%)



3. Once we remember second nature, we see that operations of nature can include circumstances whose descriptions place them in the logical space of reasons, *sui generis* though that logical space is. This makes it possible to accommodate impressions in nature without posing a threat to empiricism. From the thesis that receiving an impression is a transaction in nature, there is now no good inference to the conclusion drawn by Sellars and Davidson, that the idea of receiving an impression must be foreign to the logical space in which concepts such as that of answerability function. Conceptual capacities, whose interrelations belong in the *sui generis* logical space of reasons, can be operative not only in judgements—results of a subject's actively making up her mind about something—but already in the transactions in nature that are constituted by the world's impacts on the receptive capacities of a suitable subject; that is, one who possesses the relevant concepts. Impressions can *be* cases of its perceptually appearing—being apparent—to a subject that things are thus and so. In receiving impressions, a subject can be open to the way things manifestly are. This yields a satisfying interpretation for the image of postures that are answerable to the world through being answerable to experience. (40%)