

以下英文引文之中文之詳細大意

1.

Suppose you have a friend whom you have known and trusted for years. And suppose that this friend were to do something that had no cause—no roots in her character or past dispositions. You would no longer have any reason to trust her; she might behave like a friend—after all, her action isn't caused, so anything might happen. Wouldn't whatever she did be like a bolt from the blue—except that bolts from the blue do have causes? If such a thing occurred, would it be her act? Wouldn't it rather be something that happened to her? A reliable and trustworthy friend, with such an attack of free will, might suddenly become a murderer. After all, her act has no foundation in her formed habits and past dispositions. If it just sprang into existence from nowhere, could you even call it her act? No, says the determinist: indeterminism, which was devised for the sole purpose of rescuing freedom, is actually the greatest enemy of freedom. An uncaused act did not issue from you, had no basis in you, and was something for which you could bear no responsibility. Freedom presupposes determinism and is inconceivable without it.

Are all our actions caused? Of course, says determinism, and we may be grateful that they are, else we would be stuck with the indeterminist's causeless actions. Our actions, says determinism, are caused by us. Freedom says, "I cause my actions"; determinism says, "My actions are caused by me"—both say the same thing. Without causality, how can we even speak of human actions?(30%)

2.

It is ambiguous to say of two white billiard balls A and B, 'they're the same'. They're similar in appearance, having the same colour, shape, and so on. So they are qualitatively identical to one another. But they aren't 'the same' in the sense of being one and the same ball. I could pot one and not the other, or lose one and not the other, for example. So they aren't numerically identical; rather, they are numerically distinct. Now suppose a red spot is painted on Ball A. It would retain its numerical identity through this change because it would still be one and the same as the ball it was before being painted. But its qualitative identity has altered because it now has a different appearance. So now it would be numerically and qualitatively distinct from Ball B. If a very similar red spot were then painted on Ball B, Ball B would be numerically distinct from, but numerically identical to, Ball B before being painted.

The numerical identity of objects, including persons, is an important part of philosophy. Metaphysicians are taxed by a number of related issues that are connected by the notion of identity conditions. The general question is: what governs whether two things are numerically identical? What makes this the same car as the one I had re-sprayed last year? What makes me the same person as the one who stole that pen ten years ago? Conversely, what changes and transformations can a thing undergo and retain its numerical identity? What features of an object are necessary in that, without them, it is no longer that object? The aim, then, is to discover identity conditions for objects. These will differ between kinds of objects. Colour is not an identity conditions for cars, or for chameleons; but it is for some paintings. (350%)

3.

It holds that particular moral judgments are not purely particular, as the act-deontologist claims, but implicitly general. For the act-deontologist, "This is what X ought to do in situation Y" does not entail anything about what X or anyone else should do in similar situations. Suppose that I go to Jones for advice about what to do in situation Y, and he tells me that I morally ought to do Z. Suppose I also recall that the day before he had maintained that W was the right thing for Smith to do in a situation of the same kind. I shall then certainly point this out to Jones and ask him if he is not being inconsistent. Now suppose that Jones does not do anything to show that the two cases are different, but simply says, "No, there is no connection between the two cases. Sure, they are alike, but one was yesterday and involved Smith. Now it's today and you are involved." Surely, this would strike us as an odd response from anyone who purports to be talking the moral point of view or giving moral advice. The fact is that when one makes a moral judgment in a particular situation, one implicitly commits oneself to making the same judgment in any similar situation, even if the second situation occurs at a different time or place, or involves another agent. Moral and value predicates are such that if they belong to an action or object, they also belong to any other action or object which has the same properties. If I say I ought to serve my country, I imply that everyone ought to serve his country. The point involved here is called the Principle of Universalizability: if one judges that X is right or good, then one is committed to judging that anything exactly like X or like X in relevant respects, is right or good. Otherwise he has no business using these words."(35%)