

國立中正大學哲學研究所九十八學年度博士班入學考試英文試題

◎本測驗旨在測量英文閱讀與理解能力，請說明以下引文論旨，不必逐句翻譯：

1. The first thing to note, for Mill, is that the fact a view is unpopular is no reason at all to silence it: 'If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind' (*On Liberty*, 142). In fact, Mill argues, we have very good reason to welcome the advocacy even of unpopular views. To suppress them would be to 'rob the human race, posterity as well as the existing generation'. How so? Well, Mill argues that, whether the controversial view is true, false, or a mix of the two, we will never gain by refusing it a voice. If we suppress a true view (or one that is partially true) then we lose the chance to exchange error, whole or partial, for truth. But if we suppress a false view we lose in a different way: to challenge, reconsider, and perhaps reaffirm, our true views. So there is nothing to gain by suppression, whatever the truth of the view in question. (25%)
2. The central problem facing any twentieth-century dualist is that twentieth-century science denies any causal powers to unreduced phenomenal properties. Such properties differ in this respect from electromagnetic forces. Electromagnetic fields have physical effects. They alter the motion of certain kinds of material particles. But it would fly in the face of modern physical science to suppose that mental properties have such causal powers. This would in effect postulate an extra mental force alongside the fundamental physical forces of gravity, the electroweak force, and the strong nuclear force. This might once have made sense, but the cumulative evidence of two centuries of physiological research weighs heavily against it. Certainly most physicists would be flabbergasted if it turned out that material particles—molecules in our brains, maybe—are sometimes accelerated, not because of any known physical forces, but because of irreducibly mental causes. Some philosophers are able to turn a blind eye to this argument. But those familiar with modern physics will recognise its strength. (25%)

3. In *Principia Ethica*, G. E. Moore used the open question argument (OQA) to deny that moral properties, such as rightness or goodness, are natural or metaphysical (that is, supernatural) properties. Moral properties, on his view, are nonnatural and *sui generis*. The OQA attempts to establish this ontological or metaphysical thesis by semantic means. The OQA assumes that if moral properties are natural properties, then moral predicates can be defined in terms of natural predicates, which Moore apparently understood as nonmoral predicates drawn from the natural and social sciences (broadly construed). In arguing this way, Moore assumed something like *the semantic test of properties*, according to which predicates pick out the same property just in case they are synonymous. The OQA is supposed to show that no moral predicate is synonymous with any natural or, more generally, nonmoral predicate. Consider any moral predicate 'M' and any nonmoral predicate 'N'. If 'M' and 'N' mean the same thing, then it ought to be an analytic truth that N -things are M, just as it is an analytic truth that M-things are M. We can see, though, that there are no such analytic truths. It is not possible to doubt that M-things are M—"Is this M-thing M?" is always a closed question. However, it is always possible to doubt that N-things are M—"Is this N-thing M?" is always an open question. The fact that the first question is closed but the second is open shows that they are not *epistemically equivalent*—that is, they differ in what can be believed about them. Epistemic inequivalence would establish semantic inequivalence if speakers were authoritative about the meaning of their words. Speakers would be authoritative about the meanings of their words if a *descriptive* theory of meaning—according to which the meaning of a word or phrase is the set of descriptions or properties that speakers conventionally associate with it—were true. For, on a descriptive theory, if two terms are synonymous (semantically equivalent), speakers competent with both terms must associate the same properties or descriptions with both terms and should be able to recognize that they do. The epistemic inequivalence of the sentences using 'M' and 'N' implies that speakers associate different descriptions with those terms and, hence, that those terms differ in meaning. The semantic test of properties, then, implies that M and N are different properties. In this way, the OQA undermines ethical naturalism: the failure of synonymy implies that moral predicates are not naturalistically definable, and the semantic test of properties implies that, as a result, moral properties are not natural properties. (50%)