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◎本測驗旨在測量英文閱讀與理解能力，請說明以下引文論旨，不必逐句翻譯：

1. To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true. (10%)
2. Human beings are *condemned* to choice and action. Maybe you think you can avoid it, by resolutely standing still, refusing to act, refusing to move. But it's no use, for that will be something you have chosen to do, and then you will have acted after all. Choosing not to act makes not acting a kind of action, makes it something that you do.

This is not to say that you cannot fail to act. Of course you can. You can fall asleep at the wheel, you can faint dead away, you can be paralyzed with terror, you can be helpless with pain, or grief can turn you to stone. And then you will fail to act. But you can't *undertake* to be in those conditions—if you did, you'd be faking, and what's more, you'd be acting, in a wonderfully double sense of that word. So as long as you're in charge, so long as nothing happens to derail you, you must act. You have no choice but to choose, and to act on your choice.

So action is necessary. What kind of necessity is this? Philosophers like to distinguish between *logical* and *causal* necessity. But the necessity of action isn't either of those. There's no logical contradiction in the idea of a person not acting, at least on any particular occasion. You could not fail to act, in all the ways I've just described, if there were. And although particular actions, or anyway particular movements, may have causes, the general necessity of action is not an event that is caused. I'm not talking about something that works *on* you, whether you know it or not, like a cause: I am talking about a necessity you are *faced* with.

Now sometimes we also talk about *rational* necessity, the necessity of following the principles of reason. If you believe the premises, then you *must* draw the conclusion. If you will the end, then you *must* will the means. That's rational necessity, and it's a necessity you are faced with, so that comes closer.

But the necessity of action isn't quite like that either, for in those cases we have an if-clause, and the necessity of action is, by contrast, as Kant would say, unconditional. The necessity of choosing and acting is not causal, logical, or rational necessity. It is our *plight*: the simple inexorable fact of the human condition. (40%)

3. In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" [TD], Quine characterizes and rejects three approaches to making sense of analyticity...A third approach relies on the verificationist theory of meaning. According to that theory, "every meaningful statement is held to be translatable into a statement (true or false) about immediate experience" [TD, 38] or, less radically, "each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation" [TD, 41]. Analytic statements are, then, those that are confirmed come what experiences may. If either version of the verificationist approach were correct, then there would be objective facts about the extensions of terms from intuitive semantics, for example, "' . . . ' is synonymous with ' ' " and " ' . . . ' is analytic," across all languages. In short, such metalinguistic terms would be transcendent.

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Quine's claim isn't that if you get recalcitrant data, everything has to go; it's that what goes and what stays is determined by theory. Specifically, what goes and what stays can't be decided apriori by appeal to semantics; and **that's** enough to thwart any effort to derive the legitimacy of "is analytic in L" from confirmationism. The heart of the argument is that confirmation is an immanent, not a transcendent, notion. So, "analyticity" defined as "confirmed no matter what" is itself immanent, not transcendent. But a transcendent characterization is required to ground mathematical and logical knowledge.

Someone might challenge this premise by trying to characterize confirmation as follow:

e confirms H iff e raises the probability of H.

This characterization seems perfectly general, and therefore, it seems transcendent. Though it is true that whether e raises the probability of H or not depends on what theory one holds, why does this make the notion immanent? It seems to just make it relative.

This reply misses the point. The kind of characterization needed is one which looks at a body of data and a hypothesis and tells us how well confirmed the latter is by the former. That is, what's wanted is a confirmation function...Put somewhat differently, confirmation is transcendent iff all statements of the form "e confirms H" are true or false apriori. If whether e confirms H depends on empirical information, then it depends on which empirical theory is true. Appeal to relativity doesn't do away with this problem. (50%)