

國立中正大學哲學研究所101學年度博士班入學考試英文試題

❖ 本測驗旨在測量英文閱讀與理解能力，請說明以下引文論旨，不必逐句翻譯

1. Perceptual experience represents a particular environment of the perceiver. Normally, a perceiver uses this representation as his or her representation of the environment. That is to say, the perceiver uses it in order to negotiate the furniture. In still other words, this representation is used as the perceiver's belief about his environment. This sort of use of perceptual representations is the normal case, although there are exceptions when a perceiver exhibits his or her natural tendency and refrains from using a perceptual representation (or certain aspects of that representation) as a guide to the environment, as a belief about the surroundings. The content of perceptual representation is functionally defined in part by the ways in which this representation normally arises in perception and in part by the ways in which the representation is normally used to guide actions. (30%)

✧ From: Harman, Gilbert. "The Intrinsic Quality of Experiences"

2. A tension arises in Blackburn's separation of projectivism from an error theory. To begin with at least, it is natural to put the projectivist thought, and Blackburn characteristically does put it, by saying that ethical commitments should not be understood as having truth-conditions. That would represent ethical remarks as statements about how things are, and according to projectivism they should be taken rather to express attitudes or sentiments. But quasi-realism is supposed to make room for all the trappings of realism, including the idea that the notion of truth applies after all to ethical remarks. In that case, the original sharp contrast between putting forward a candidate for being true and expressing an attitude or sentiment cannot be right: a remark that expresses an attitude can also affirm a truth. Does this mean that projectivist quasi-realism is self-defeating? (30%)

✧ From: McDowell, John. "Projection and Truth in Ethics."

3. On the traditional conception of mind deriving from Descartes, the mind is a private inner stage, aptly called the Cartesian theater by some philosophers, on which mental actions take place... One and only one person has a view of the stage, and no one else is permitted a look. Moreover, that single person, who owns the theater, has a full and authoritative view of what goes in the theater... In contrast, the outsiders must depend on what she says and does to guess what might be happening in the theater; no direct viewing is allowed... Evidently, all this points to an asymmetry between the first person and the third person where knowledge of mental states is concerned: Our knowledge of our mental current mental states is *direct*, in that it is not mediated by evidence or inference, and *authoritative*, or *privileged*, in that in normal circumstances, it is immune to the third person's challenge, "how do you know?"...

Early in the twentieth century, however, some philosophers and psychologists began to question this traditional conception of mentality; they thought that it led to unacceptable consequences, consequences that seemingly contradict our ordinary assumptions and practices involving knowledge of other minds and our use of language to talk about mental states, both ours and others. (40%)

✧ From: Kim, Jaegwon. Philosophy of Mind.