2014 中正博士班入學考英文試題

請簡述下列各題摘選段落之大意(不用逐字翻譯),並闡述摘選段落中的哲學意涵與論證(勿拘泥於翻譯)。

1. Excerpt from Soames, Scott. (2003). *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century*, vol. 2, "Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding, and Following a Rule" (33%)

Next consider a different case. One day some people who live on an island come across a few little furry animals and decide to call them *rabbits*. They say, *Let's introduce the word 'rabbit' to apply to these animals*, whereby *these animals* they mean any animal of the same species as those they just encountered. (They have some idea of what a species is, and they can recognize instances of several different species, though they may have no definition of the notion.) Over time, people in the community learn the word *rabbit*, and apply it to the various rabbits they come across on the island. This goes on long after the original rabbits that prompted the introduction of the term have died. Then one day some islanders make an unprecedented trip to the mainland. Among the things they discover are animals that look a lot like the rabbits on their home island. They simply assume that these animals are of the same kind as those on the island, and they call them *rabbits* too.

The travelers bring this news back to the island, and it is routinely accepted by most members of the population that there are rabbits on the mainland, as well. However, a few skeptics doubt this. Hence, although most members of the linguistic community apply the term *rabbit* both to animals on the island and to animals on the mainland, a few insist that the latter are not rabbits. If the standard of correctness for any application of the term were simply agreement with the applications actually made by the larger linguistic community, then it would follow that the skeptics in this case are, by definition, wrong when they refuse to apply the word to the animals on the mainland.

But they are not wrong by definition. Suppose it is eventually discovered that the animals on the mainland have a different evolutionary history from the animals on the island, that they have different cellular structure and DNA, and that they are **not** members of the same species as the animals on the island. The proper conclusion to draw in such a case is that most members of the linguistic community were wrong when they said that the animals on the mainland were rabbits.8 But if that is so, then the standard of correctness for the application of a term is **not** simply agreement

with the application that most members of the community actually make.

2. Excerpt from Carroll, Noel. (1999). *Philosophy of Art*, Chapter 5 "Art, Definition and Identification" (33%)

According to the family resemblance approach, the way in which we go about identifying artworks—the way that we sort the art from the nonart —is by looking for similarities between works already regarded to be artworks and new candidates. Ideally, the process begins by establishing a flexible set of paradigmatic artworks—works everyone agrees are unquestionably artworks. On the basis of these, we then decide about the art status of further works. At any given moment in time, then, we will have in our possession a set of artworks comprised of paradigms and recognized descendants of paradigms. If in the present moment, we are perplexed about the status of a new work, we are instructed to look at the body of works already adjudged to be artworks and to see whether the new work in question bears appreciable similarities to the items in our existing set of acknowledged artworks.

Perhaps the new work is similar to *Tristam Shandy* in its possession of an elliptical narrative structure, like *Oedipus Rex* in its capacity to raise pity and fear, and it resembles Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony* in its sublimity. As these correspondences accumulate, we decide to classify the new work as an artwork, though no established numerical criterion determines how many correspondences are required here. Rather, we reflect on the resemblances and make an all-things-considered judgment.

But there is a really big problem with this story. It is that the concept of similarity upon which the family resemblance method relies is too slack. For, it is a truism of logic that everything resembles everything else in some respect. For example, artists and asteroids resemble each other, if only in respect to being physical objects. Likewise, an alien carburetor from another galaxy will resemble Rodin's *Gate of Hell,* at least in respect of its material objecthood, as well as probably in a number of other respects as well.

3. Excerpt from Steward, Helen. (2009). "Free Will" in John Shand (ed.) *Central Issues of Philosophy* (34%)

Compatibilism
In the face of these difficulties with indeterminism, the majority of philosophers have tended to think that the best hope for free will lies in the project of trying to show that despite first appearances, free will is not in fact incompatible with determinism after

all – that we can have what we want *even if* determinism is true of the macrophysical universe. This view is called *compatibilism*, and is contrasted with the *incompatibilist* line of thinking I outlined above, according to which determinism cannot be made consistent with the idea of free will. There are a number of different compatibilist strategies. One historically popular move lies in the observation that causes should not be thought of, as they seem to be by the incompatibilist, as events which bring their effects inexorably in their train. The incompatibilist appears to be relying on a conception of laws of nature according to which the laws *make* things happen as they do. But this, it is said, is a mere confusion. Causal laws are just descriptions of regularities that have so far been found to describe our universe successfully. We should not think of them as metaphysical realities, sewn into the fabric of the world, constraining and dictating the shape of things to come. Rather, they are just *post facto* creations of our own, in principle capable of infinite adjustment and alteration so as to conform to what in fact is found to occur in actuality, not pre-existent rails along which the world must run.