

臺灣綜合大學系統 111 學年度學士班轉學生聯合招生考試試題

科目名稱	哲學概論	類組代碼	B20
		科目碼	B2091

※本項考試依簡章規定所有考科均「不可」使用計算機。

本科試題共計 5 頁

壹、單選題（共二十題，每題 2.5 分）

- “Philosophy”這個字源於希臘文 *philos* 與 *sophía*。請問這兩個字分別是什麼意思？  
(A)「善」與「智慧」；(B)「真」與「善」；(C)「愛」與「智慧」；(D)「愛」與「真」；  
(E)「愛」與「理性」。
- 中正哲學系學生需要完成三個領域的必選課程，以下哪一門課不是必選課程？  
(A)心靈哲學；(B)政治哲學；(C)科學哲學；(D)應用倫理學；(E)美學。
- 以下哪一門課不是中正哲學系的必修課程？  
(A)中國哲學史；(B)形上學；(C)倫理學；(D)知識論；(E)以上皆是必修。
- 以下哪一個領域是中正哲學系的重點領域？  
(A)中國哲學史；(B)西洋哲學史；(C)歐陸哲學；(D)分析哲學；(E)以上皆是。
- 以下哪一位哲學家不是歐陸哲學家？  
(A) Martin Heidegger；(B) Gottlob Frege；(C) Maurice Merleau-Ponty；(D) Edmund Husserl；  
(E) Jacques Derrida。
- 以下哪一位哲學家不是分析哲學家？  
(A) Ludwig Wittgenstein；(B) Alain Badiou；(C) Alfred Jules Ayer；(D) Willard Van Orman  
Quine；(E) Rudolf Carnap。
- 「電車問題」(the trolley problem)屬於哪一個領域的問題？  
(A)倫理學；(B)知識論；(C)形上學；(D)心靈哲學；(E)科學哲學。
- 「忒修斯之船」(ship of Theseus)屬於哪一個領域的問題？  
(A)倫理學；(B)知識論；(C)形上學；(D)心靈哲學；(E)科學哲學。
- 「葛梯爾問題」(the Gettier problem)屬於哪一個領域的問題？  
(A)倫理學；(B)知識論；(C)形上學；(D)心靈哲學；(E)科學哲學。
- 《利維坦》(Leviathan)一書的作者是誰？  
(A) John Locke；(B) Plato；(C) René Descartes；(D) Thomas Hobbes；(E) Augustine。
- 《第一哲學沉思集》(Meditations on First Philosophy)一書的作者是誰？  
(A) John Locke；(B) Plato；(C) René Descartes；(D) Thomas Hobbes；(E) Augustine。
- 《正義論》(A Theory of Justice)一書的作者是誰？  
(A) John Rawls；(B) David Hume；(C) Robert Nozick；(D) Niccolò Machiavelli；(E) Jean-  
Jacques Rousseau。
- 《效益主義》(Utilitarianism)一書的作者是誰？  
(A) John Stuart Mill；(B) John Locke；(C) Jeremy Bentham；(D) Edmund Burke；(E) Jean-  
Jacques Rousseau。
- 以下哪一個著作的作者不是哲學家康德(Immanuel Kant)？  
(A)《純粹理性批判》；(B)《實踐理性批判》；(C)《判斷力批判》；(D)《辯證理性批  
判》；(E)《永久和平論》。
- 以下哪一個著作的作者不是哲學家黑格爾(Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel)？  
(A)《精神現象學》；(B)《知覺現象學》；(C)《邏輯學》；(D)《哲學科學百科全書》；(E)  
《法哲學原理》。
- 《人性論》(A Treatise of Human Nature)一書的作者是誰？  
(A) John Locke；(B) George Berkeley；(C) Jean-Jacques Rousseau；(D) Francis Bacon；  
(E) David Hume。

17. 「存在就是被感知」(to be is to be perceived)這句名言是哪一位哲學家的主張？  
 (A) John Locke；(B) George Berkeley；(C) Jean-Jacques Rousseau；(D) Francis Bacon；  
 (E) David Hume。
18. 笛卡兒認為若要獲得知識得先排除任何懷疑的可能，他認為首先可以確定知道「我的存在」，請問笛卡兒的理由是什麼？  
 (A)理論的必要預設；(B)上帝的保證；(C)我在思考；(D)我感知到我的身體；(E)以上皆是。
19. 「人心起初是一塊白板」是哪一個哲學流派的主張？  
 (A)經驗主義；(B)理性主義；(C)直覺主義；(D)神秘主義；(E)心理主義。
20. 現代哲學家把性質分為「初性」(primary quality)與「次性」(secondary quality)，這個區分是基於哪一項特性？  
 (A)價值高低；(B)時間先後；(C)抽象程度；(D)客觀性程度；(E)美醜之別。

貳、閱讀測驗（每題組各五題單選題，共二十題，每題 2.5 分）

一、Elizabeth Harman, "The Moral Significance of Animal Pain and Animal Death"

I am interested in the claim that we have a certain kind of strong reason against animal cruelty. As will emerge, I take our reasons against animal cruelty to be strong in several ways. One way they are strong is the following: if an action would cause significant suffering to an animal, then that action is pro tanto wrong; that is, the action is wrong unless justified by other considerations. Such a view of animal cruelty is part of a more general non-consequentialist view on which there is a moral asymmetry between causing harm and causing positive benefit: our reasons against harming are stronger and of a different type than our reasons in favor of benefiting (and our reasons against preventing benefits).

I will argue that the Surprising Claim is false.

The Surprising Claim:

- (a) we have strong reasons not to cause intense pain to animals: the fact that an action would cause intense pain to an animal makes the action wrong unless it is justified by other considerations; and
- (b) we do not have strong reasons not to kill animals: it is not the case that killing an animal is wrong unless it is justified by other considerations.

Consider part (a) of the Surprising Claim. If (a) is true, what explains its truth? It seems that it must be true because animals have moral status, and because any action that significantly harms something with moral status is impermissible unless justified by other considerations.

Here is an argument that the Surprising Claim is false:

1. If it is true that we have strong moral reasons against causing intense pain to animals, such that doing so is impermissible unless justified by other considerations, then part of the explanation of this truth is that animals have moral status.
2. If it is true that we have strong moral reasons against causing intense pain to animals, such that doing so is impermissible unless justified by other considerations, then part of the explanation of this truth is that significantly harming something with moral status is impermissible unless justified by other considerations.
3. If an action painlessly kills a healthy animal in the prime of life, then that action significantly harms the animal.
4. If it is true that we have strong moral reasons against causing intense pain to animals, such that doing so is impermissible unless justified by other considerations, then painlessly killing a healthy animal in the prime of life is impermissible unless justified by other considerations.
5. Therefore, the Surprising Claim is false.

21. 以下哪一個解釋是對這句話“the action is pro tanto wrong”的最佳說明？

- (A)it is wrong all things considered；(B)it is sometimes wrong；(C)it is wrong when other considerations are included；(D)it is wrong by any means；(E)it is wrong when there is no overriding reason。

22. 文中指的道德不對稱(moral asymmetry)，指得是下列哪一個？  
 (A)支持傷害的理由比支持造福的理由強；(B)支持傷害的理由比反對造福的理由強；(C)反對傷害的理由比支持造福的理由強；(D)反對傷害的理由比反對造福的理由強；(E)以上皆非。
23. 請問以下哪一個道德主張是對 The Surprising Claim 最準確的說明？  
 (A)在沒有其他考量下，不可以造成動物痛苦也不可以殺害動物；(B)在沒有其他考量下，不可以造成動物痛苦但可以殺害動物；(C)在沒有其他考量下，可以造成動物痛苦但不可以殺害動物；(D)無論如何，可以造成動物痛苦也不可以殺害動物；(E)無論如何，不可以造成動物痛苦但可以殺害動物。
24. 文中反對 The Surprising Claim 的論證是演繹論證，演繹論證具有哪一點特徵？  
 (A)若論證有效，則結論必然為真；(B)若前提都為真，則結論必然為真；(C)若結論為假，則論證無效；(D)前三項皆是；(E)前三項皆非。
25. 根據本文，不應該傷害動物的理由是什麼？  
 (A)動物具有道德地位(moral status)；(B)傷害就是錯的；(C)傷害會製造痛苦；(D)剝奪生命是不對的；(E)傷害動物會傷害到喜愛動物的人士。

## 二、Timothy Williamson, “Knowledge and Belief”

The most striking difference between knowledge and belief is that although there is false belief, there cannot be false knowledge. People once believed that the earth was flat. They believed falsely, because the earth was not flat. They did not know that the earth was flat, because knowing that the earth was flat would have required the earth to be flat. They believed that they knew that the earth was flat, but that was another of their false beliefs.

The upshot so far is that knowledge implies true belief. But true belief does not imply knowledge. If Larry believes that the name of the capital of California starts with “S,” he believes truly, since the capital is Sacramento. But if that belief rests only on his irrational belief that the capital is San Francisco, Larry does not know that the name of the capital begins with “S.” Similarly, although either John or Mary has a true belief as to whether there is life on other planets, perhaps neither of them knows whether there is life on other planets, because neither of them has sufficient evidence for their belief.

Many philosophers have reacted to such examples by asking: What must be added to true belief to get knowledge? At one time a popular answer was justification, in the sense of blameless belief. The idea was that Larry’s true belief that the name of the capital begins with “S” does not amount to knowledge because he deserves blame for irrationally believing that the name of the capital begins with “S”; his belief, although it happens to be true, is not justified. However, we can imagine a slightly different story, in which Barry is the victim of a massive hoax, so that he has strong misleading evidence that San Francisco is the capital. For example, that is what his high school teacher tells the class, everyone whom he asks confirms that it is, his classmates hack into his computer so that he cannot access websites that say differently, and so on. Barry’s beliefs that San Francisco is the capital and that the name of the capital begins with “S” are blameless, and in that sense justified. Thus Barry has a justified true belief that the name of the capital begins with “S,” but he still does not know that the name of the capital begins with “S.” For he does not know that San Francisco is the capital, because that is false, and beliefs based on ignorance do not constitute knowledge. In his famous article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” [the author] used such examples to make just this point, that justified true belief is not always knowledge.

26. 根據本文，以下關於信念(belief)與知識(knowledge)的描述正確？  
 (A)信念是關於自我心靈，知識是關於外在世界；(B)信念蘊含知識，知識蘊含信念；(C)真信念即為知識；(D)信念有真有假，知識必然為真；(E)以上皆是。
27. 根據本文，知識需要「證成」(justification)這個條件，以下文中哪一個例子滿足證成條件？  
 (A)Larry’s true but irrational belief；(B)John’s true belief that lacks sufficient evidence；  
 (C)Barry’s true belief that is based on strong misleading evidence；(D)前三者皆是；(E)前三者皆非。

28. 根據本文，以下哪種信念可以視為知識？

(A) true belief ; (B) justified true belief ; (C) justified and rational true belief ; (D) justified, rational, and blameless true belief ; (E) 以上皆非。

29. 根據本文，古人相信「地球是平的」不能算是知識，理由是什麼？

(A) 古人的信念不理性；(B) 地球不是平的；(C) 古人沒有認真觀察；(D) 前三者皆是；(E) 前三者皆非。

30. 根據本文，Barry 相信「加州首府的首字母為 s」不能算是知識，理由是什麼？

(A) Barry 的信念不理性；(B) 加州首府的首字母不是 s；(C) Barry 的信念缺乏證成；(D) Barry 不應該輕易相信他人；(E) Barry 的信念是基於錯誤的理由。

### 三、John Searle, “Can Computer Think?”

The prevailing view in philosophy, psychology, and artificial intelligence is one which emphasizes the analogies between the functioning of the human brain and the functioning of digital computers. According to the most extreme version of this view, the brain is just a digital computer and the mind is just a computer program. One could summarize this view—I call it “strong artificial intelligence,” or “strong AI”—by saying that the mind is to the brain, as the program is to the computer hardware...

It is essential to our conception of a digital computer that its operations can be specified purely formally; that is, we specify the steps in the operation of the computer in terms of abstract symbols—sequences of zeroes and ones printed on a tape, for example. A typical computer “rule” will determine that when a machine is in a certain state and it has a certain symbol on its tape, then it will perform a certain operation such as erasing the symbol or printing another symbol and then enter another state such as moving the tape one square to the left. But the symbols have no meaning; they have no semantic content; they are not about anything. They have to be specified purely in terms of their formal or syntactical structure. The zeroes and ones, for example, are just numerals; they don’t even stand for numbers. Indeed, it is this feature of digital computers that makes them so powerful. One and the same type of hardware, if it is appropriately designed, can be used to run an indefinite range of different programs. And one and the same program can be run on an indefinite range of different types of hardwares.

But this feature of programs, that they are defined purely formally or syntactically, is fatal to the view that mental processes and program processes are identical. And the reason can be stated quite simply. There is more to having a mind than having formal or syntactical processes. Our internal mental states, by definition, have certain sorts of contents. If I am thinking about Kansas City or wishing that I had a cold beer to drink or wondering if there will be a fall in interest rates, in each case my mental state has a certain mental content in addition to whatever formal features it might have. That is, even if my thoughts occur to me in strings of symbols, there must be more to the thought than the abstract strings, because strings by themselves can’t have any meaning. If my thoughts are to be about anything, then the strings must have a meaning which makes the thoughts about those things. In a word, the mind has more than a syntax, it has a semantics. The reason that no computer program can ever be a mind is simply that a computer program is only syntactical, and minds are more than syntactical. Minds are semantical, in the sense that they have more than a formal structure, they have a content.

31. 根據本文，Strong AI 是什麼主張？

(A) 人心就是一種電腦程式；(B) 人心就是一種電腦；(C) 人心可以化約成人腦；(D) 任何電腦都具有心靈；(E) AI 比人心更強大。

32. 根據本文，電腦運算的程式語言具有哪些特徵？

(A) 具有語法(syntax)與語意(semantics)；(B) 有語法無語意；(C) 有語意無語法；(D) 無語法也無語意；(E) 即自然語言。

33. 根據本文，電腦要像人心思考，所面臨的困難是什麼？

(A) 缺乏生物機能的肉體；(B) 無法進行足夠複雜的運算；(C) 缺乏神經網路；(D) 無法學習語言的意義；(E) 以上皆是。

34. 根據本文，電腦可能像人心一樣思考嗎？

(A) 現在科技作不到，但未來有可能；(B) 現在科技已經做到；(C) 不可能；(D) 不可知；(E) 這是無意義的哲學問題。

35. 根據本文，當你跟電腦聊天，電腦瞭解你在說什麼嗎？

(A)瞭解；(B)不瞭解；(C)由聊天者判定；(D)我們無法確定；(E)這是無意義的哲學問題。

四、Onora O'Neill, "The Moral Perplexities of Famine and World Hunger"

The second moral theory whose scope and determinacy in dealing with famine problems I shall consider was developed by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (康德). Kant does not try to generate a set of precise rules defining human obligations in all possible circumstances; instead, he attempts to provide a set of principles of obligation that can be used as the starting points for moral reasoning in actual contexts of action. The primary focus of Kantian ethics is, then, on action rather than results, as in utilitarian (效益論) thinking. To know what sort of action is required (or forbidden) in which circumstances, we should not look just at the expected results of action but, in the first instance, at the nature of the proposed actions themselves.

The famous Categorical Imperative (定言令式) plays the same role in Kantian thinking that the Greatest Happiness Principle plays in utilitarian thought. One formulation of the Categorical Imperative is The Formula of the End in Itself: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end."

We use others as mere means if what we do reflects some maxim to which they could not in principle consent. Kant does not suggest that there is anything wrong about using someone as a means. Evidently every cooperative scheme of action does this. In such examples each party to the transaction can and does consent to take part in that transaction. Kant would say that the parties to such transactions use one another but do not use one another as mere means. Each party assumes that the other has its own maxims of action and is not just a thing or prop to be used or manipulated.

But there are other cases where one party to an arrangement or transaction not only uses the other but does so in ways that could only be done on the basis of a fundamental principle or maxim to which the other could not in principle consent. If a false promise is given, the party that accepts the promise is not just used but used as a mere means, because it is impossible for consent to be given to the fundamental principle or project of deception that must guide every false promise, whatever its surface character. Another standard way of using others as mere means is by coercing them. Coercers, like deceivers, standardly don't give others the possibility of dissenting from what they propose to do.

36. 根據本文，對於康德倫理學與效益論的描述，下列何者正確？

(A)康德倫理學是一種特殊的效益論；(B)康德倫理學不考慮行為的結果；(C)效益論著重個體的價值；(D)兩者必然產生不同的道德規範；(E)以上皆非。

37. 根據本文，對於康德倫理學內涵的描述，下列何者正確？

(A)詳盡列出不同情境下的道德規範；(B)教導如何計算出行為的後果；(C)勾勒道德思考的道德法則；(D)以上皆是；(E)以上皆非。

38. 以下哪些對於文中定言令式的描述是正確的？

(A)把人當成目的對待；(B)可以把人當成手段對待；(C)不可以把人只當成手段對待；(D)以上皆是；(E)以上皆非。

39. 根據文中對於定言令式的解釋，以下哪種行為不被允許？

(A)用詐騙方式獲取財物；(B)提出高額金錢向他人購買器官；(C)見死不救，即便只需小小付出；(D)皆可允許；(E)皆不允許。

40. 根據文中對於定言令式的解釋，以下哪種行為可被允許？

(A)為了防疫強制民眾不得外出；(B)撒謊為了安慰癌末母親；(C)從事性交易；(D)皆可允許；(E)皆不允許。