讲题：The No-Miracle Argument Overhauled
时间：2020.12.30 (Wed.) 15:10-17:00
The no-miracle argument (NMA) is often regarded as the ultimate argument for scientific realism. At its core, NMA relies on the idea that a scientific theory being approximately true is the hypothesis that best explains why the theory is able to make novel prediction. But NMA faces a number of daunting objections. First, the notion of approximate truth is unclear. Second, the predictive success of a scientific theory is really comparative success, which falls short of rendering the theory approximately true. Third, NMA is undermined by the fact that false theories can also make novel predictive successes. Fourth, NMA cannot account for the phenomena of revolutionary changes of scientific theory. In this talk, I will introduce and defend a new NMA that is immune to these four objections. This new NMA draws on the semantic machinery of being true about a subject matter.