講題：Do We Need the Notion of Utterance Meaning When Interpreting Literary Utterances?
時間：2020.12.23 (Wed.) 15:10-17:00
Abstract: One popular trend in contemporary analytic philosophy of art is to construe literary works (and perhaps artworks in general) as utterances and interpret them as such. Following discussions on utterance interpretation in the philosophy of language, some actual intentionalists suggest that a satisfactory theory of literary interpretation should address the constitutive question—what determines the meaning of a literary utterance? These intentionalists hold that the major anti-intentionalist positions on interpretation fail to give a good answer to this question. However, a recent account from pragmatics argues that we do utterance interpretation without positing the category of utterance meaning. This account is anti-intentionalist in the broad sense but intriguingly speaker-oriented. My aim is to (1) show that how the conversational approaches to utterance interpretation presented by this recent account map onto major positions on literary interpretation; (2) show that the dispensability of utterance meaning in conversational utterances applies to literary utterances as well. The result is that a plausible theory of literary interpretation need not answer the constitutive question, nor must it take account of the author’s actual intention. And this result is completely compatible with the theory being intention-based.