跳到主要內容區

[講座與會議] National Chung Cheng University (CCU) Online Lecture Series:Jonathan Dancy’s Moral Philosophy (July 20-21, 2023)

 

中正大學哲學系

 

Jonathan Dancy's moral philosophy

 

National Chung Cheng University (CCU) Online Lecture Series:

Jonathan Dancy’s Moral Philosophy (July 20-21, 2023)

 

 

Description of Lecture Series:

 

This lecture series is devoted to Jonathan Dancy’s moral philosophy. Dancy is most renowned for his ground-breaking work on moral particularism, which, as he put it, is the view that the rationality of moral judgment and thought does not depend upon a supply of moral principles. Furthermore, particularism is rooted in his also renowned work on reasons holism, the view that what makes a moral reason for or against action in one context may not do so in another. For the past four decades, Dancy’s twin doctrines of particularism and reasons holism have been subjected to a (purportedly) thorough examination, or have they? On the front of particularism, some express sympathies, advocating ‘shapelessness’ of the moral with respect to the natural in support (e.g. Peter Tsu, Debbie Roberts, and Simon Kirchin), while others remain unconvinced (Michael Ridge, Sean McKeever, Pekka Väyrynen, Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit, Mark Schroeder), upholding various forms of anti-particularist/principled ethics. On the front of reasons holism, although it has attracted many supporters (Simon Kirchin, Alan Thomas, Christine Swanton, Ralf Bader), it is not lacking in dissenters as well (Roger Crisp, David McNaughton & Piers Rawling, Selim Berker, Daniel Fogal, Peter Tsu). Have the debates on both fronts lapsed into a deadlock? Could more progress be made on these issues? In this lecture series, we feel honored to invite Jonathan Dancy who provoked all these debates to give an opening address whose title will be ‘What Was Prichard’s Problem?’ and in which he will further develop his view of reasons as ‘favorers’ by examining the metaphysics of the favoring relation. He will be joined by speakers and discussants who are stimulated by his moral philosophy (five of whom are from Asia), discussing its central themes ranging from particularism, reasons holism to rationality, narrative justification, practical reasoning and organic unities, etc. Dancy will also serve as a commentator. Part of the purpose of this lecture series is to make progress on various issues triggered off by Dancy’s moral philosophy, and part of it is to make Asian voices on relevant issues heard. (written by organizer: Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu)

Opening Address/Keynote Speaker:

Jonathan Dancy (Professor, University of Texas at Austin, U.S.; Fellow of British Academy)

Chair for Dancy’s Opening Address:

Ser-Min Shei (Professor, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan)

Discussants for Dancy’s Opening Address:

Refeng Tang (Professor, Beijing Normal University, China)

Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu (Professor, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan)

Speakers: Keynotes are marked with asterisks

Nicholas Shackel* (Professor, Cardiff University/Oxford University, U.K.)

Alan Thomas* (Professor, University of York, U.K.) 

Ryo Chonabayashi (Associate Professor, Soka University, Japan)

Shunsuke Sugimoto (Associate Professor, Keio University, Japan)

Kaoru Ando (Professor, Hitotsubashi University, Japan)

Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu (Professor, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan)

Commentator

Jonathan Dancy 

Dates of Lecture Series: July 20-21 (Thursday and Friday, 15:30-21:30, Taiwan Time (GMT+8)), 2023

Application for Participation: Participation is free but application for participation is required. Please apply via https://forms.gle/sS2wFNhErbK8UM7f9. When your application is approved, you will be notified of acceptance via email with a conference link (probably around July 15). 

Day 1 Program: July 20 (Thursday) 15:30-20:25

Welcome Speech from Organizer (15 minutes): 15:30-15:45

Speaker: Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu, 

Session 1 15:45-17:20

Opening Address (40 minutes) 15:45-16:25

Speaker: Jonathan Dancy 

Title: What Was Prichard’s Problem?

Discussion (30 minutes): 16:25-16:55

  1. Discussant 1: Refeng Tang + Dancy’s Reply (15 minutes)
  2. Discussant 2: Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu + Dancy’s Reply (15 minutes) 

Q and A (25 minutes): 16:55-17:20

Break 17:20-17:30

Invited Speaker’s Talk format: Presentation (35-40 minutes)+ Dancy’s Comment (10 minutes) + Reply (5 minutes) + Q & A (15-20 minutes)=70 minutes; keynotes are marked with asterisks

Session 2  17:30-18:40 

Speaker: Ryo Chonabayashi

Title: Can Moral Particularists Be Robust Realists?

Break 18:40-18:50

Session 3 18:50-20:00 

Speaker: Kaoru Ando

Title: Moorean Axiology Still Not Dead: Dancy on Organic Unities

Break 20:00-20:10

General Discussion (Open to all) 20:10-20:25

Day 2  Program: July 21 (Friday)

Session 4 15:30-16:40 

Speaker*: Alan Thomas

Title: The Role of the Imagination in Particularist Moral Judgement

Break: 16:40-16:50

Session 5 16:50-18:00 

Speaker: Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu

Title: Particularism, Underdetermination of Reason, and Embeddedness

Break 18:00-18:10

Session 6 18:10-19:20 

Speaker: Shunsuke Sugimoto

Title: Particularism and AI 

Break 19:20-19:30

Session 7 19:30-20:40 

Speaker*: Nicholas Shackel 

Title: Norms and Normative Focus

Break: 20:40-20:50

General Discussions (open to all): 20:50-21:10

Concluding Remark: 21:10-21:25

Speaker: Jonathan Dancy 

Farewell Remark: 21:25-21:35

Speaker: Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu

Bibliography

Bader, Ralf. (2016). “Conditions, Modifiers, and Holism” in Errol Lord and Barry McGuire (eds.), 

Weighing Reasons, Oxford: OUP, pp. 27-55

Berker, Selim. (2007). “Particular Reasons”, Ethics, vol. 118, pp. 109-139

Crisp, Roger. (2007). “Ethics Without Reasons”, Journal of Moral Philosophy, vol. 4(1), pp. 40-54

Dancy, Jonathan. (1993). Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell

Dancy, Jonathan. (2004). Ethics Without Principles, Oxford: OUP

Dancy, Jonathan. (2009). "Moral Particularism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. 

Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/moral-particularism/>.

Dancy, Jonathan. (2018). Practical Shape, Oxford: OUP

Fogal, Daniel. (2016). “Reasons, Reason and Context”, in Errol Lord and Barry McGuire (eds.), 

Weighing Reasons, Oxford: OUP, pp. 74-103

Jackson, Frank, Philip Pettit & Michael Smith. (2000). “Ethical Particularism and Patterns” in Brad 

Hooker and Margaret Little (eds.), Moral Particularism, Oxford: OUP, pp. 79-99

Kirchin, Simon. (2007). “Particularism and Default Valency”, Journal of Moral Philosophy, vol. 4, no. 1, 

pp. 16-32.

Kirchin, Simon. (2010). “The Shapelessness Hypothesis”, Philosophers' Imprint, vol. 10 no. 4, pp. 1-28.

McKeever, Sean & Michael Ridge. (2006). Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal, Oxford: 

OUP

McNaughton, David & Piers Rawling. (2000). “Unprincipled Ethics” in Brad Hooker and Margaret 

Little (eds.), Moral Particularism, Oxford: OUP, pp. 256-275

Ridge, Michael & Sean McKeever. (2016). “Moral Particularism and Moral Generalism”, The Stanford 

Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-particularism-generalism/>

Roberts, Debbie. (2011). “Shapelessness and the Thick”, Ethics, vol. 121, pp. 489-520

Shackel, Nicholas. (2018). “Scope or Focus? Normative Focus and the Metaphysics of Normative 

Relations”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 115, (6), pp. 281-312

Schroeder, Mark. (2011). “Holism, Weight, and Undercutting”, Noûs, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 328-344

Swanton, Christine. (2015). “A Particularist but Codifiable Virtue Ethics”, in Mark Timmons (ed.), 

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 5, pp. 38-63

Thomas, Alan. (2007). “Practical Reasoning and Normative Relevance”, Journal of Moral Philosophy

vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 77-84

Thomas, Alan. (2006). Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge, Oxford: OUP

Tsu, Peter Shiu-Hwa. (2013). “Shapelessness and Predication Supervenience: A Limited Defense of 

Shapeless Moral Particularism”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 166, no. 1, pp. 51-67

Tsu, Peter Shiu-Hwa. (2018). “Particularism in Ethics”, in Duncan Pritchard (ed.), Oxford 

Bibliographies Online, Oxford: OUP, URL= <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0367.xml>

Tsu, Peter Shiu-Hwa. (forthcoming). “Embeddedness and the Psychological Nature of Default Reason: 

On How Particularists Should Address the Flattening Objection”, The Philosophical Quarterly.

Väyrynen, Pekka. (2006) “Moral Generalism: Enjoy in Moderation”, Ethics, vol. 116 (4), pp. 707-741

Väyrynen, Pekka. (forthcoming). “Moral Generalism and Moral Particularism (2nd edition)” in 

Christian B. Miller (ed.), The Bloomsbury Handbook of Ethics, London: Bloomsbury, pp. 381-396.

瀏覽數: